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Accounting for Sustainability in Asia: Stock Market Regulation 
and Reporting in Hong Kong and Singapore 
Abstract: Sustainability reporting ‘nudges’ firms into behaving more sustainably by forc-
ing them to account publicly for their wider social and environmental performance. This lib-
ertarian paternalist approach to governance through disclosure rather than command-and-con-
trol regulation is well established in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, but comparatively untested in 
the emerging markets of Asia where different state traditions and forms of business organiza-
tion raise questions about its transferability and effectiveness. This paper contributes to re-
search on corporate social responsibility, neoliberal environmental governance, and Asian va-
rieties of capitalism by providing the first comparative analysis of the origins, design, and ini-
tial impact of new sustainability reporting requirements on the stock markets of Hong Kong 
and Singapore. In mandating sustainability reporting, both exchanges were similarly con-
cerned with following international norms and competitors but differed in the style and gran-
ularity of their company disclosure requirements. These policy design choices reflected dif-
ferent developmental state traditions and the different audiences that market regulators in 
Hong Kong and Singapore sought to influence through these public accounts. Notwithstand-
ing substantial differences between Hong Kong’s rules-based and Singapore’s principles-
based approach to reporting, the response in both markets was remarkably similar. In both 
cases sustainability reporting was largely ignored by local market players who dismissed it as 
a foreign practice of interest to only a small number of western institutional investors and 
providing little incentive to go beyond tick box compliance. These findings raise questions 
about the effectiveness of disclosure requirements at nudging Asian businesses towards sus-
tainability. 
 
JEL codes: D22, G14, G38, M48 
Keywords: corporate sustainability reporting, Asian capitalism, developmental state, envi-
ronmental regulation, nudge 
 
In the face of climate change, the once purely voluntary practice of sustainability reporting is 
fast becoming a market requirement for major, publicly-traded corporations. In 2015, the 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) became the first in Asia to mandate all companies listed 
on its stock exchange to report their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions along with a host of 
other environmental, social and governance performance indicators (for example, waste, en-
ergy consumption, employee welfare, board gender ratio). The Singapore Exchange (SGX) 
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followed suit within a year, requiring all listed firms to observe its previously voluntary guid-
ance on sustainability reporting. These stock market regulations follow similar moves in the 
US and Europe to require sustainability reporting as part of wider efforts to harness capital 
markets to the cause of environmental sustainability. To date most of the research in eco-
nomic geography on the ‘greening’ of finance has focused on the operation and impacts of 
new quasi-markets and financial instruments, such as emissions trading and biodiversity off-
set markets (Bumpus and Liverman 2008; Bigger 2018), green bonds (Bracking 2015; John-
son 2014), and ethical investment funds (Hadfield-Hill 2007; Hughes 2011). The underlying 
mechanisms of accounting and certification that make such financial processes possible have 
largely been ignored. 
Mandatory sustainability reporting builds upon a host of voluntary initiatives to en-
courage firms to account publicly for their social and environmental performance. For more 
than two decades now its largely western-based proponents have heralded sustainability re-
porting as a cure-all that enhances company value and corrects market failure by providing 
the transparency needed for the market to reward improved environmental performance as 
much as immediate profitability (e.g. GRI 2006; KPMG 2016). Geographers have challenged 
such approaches to environmental governance through disclosure on grounds of both fairness 
and effectiveness (Guthman 2007; Knox-Hayes and Levy 2011; Havice and Campling 2017). 
Their skepticism is not unfounded. Several studies have shown that sustainability reporting 
has little effect on firm performance (Jones et al. 2007; Tang and Demeritt 2017) and often is 
merely symbolic window-dressing (Cho et al. 2015; Bowen 2014). However, past research 
has focused almost exclusively on US and European markets (e.g. Chen and Bouvain 2009), 
scarcely considering Asian economies or the role of this regulatory style in non-liberal socie-
ties. With Asia home to many of the world’s fastest growing and most polluting economies, 
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there are important questions about the mobility and effectiveness of such stock market regu-
lation in different political economies. 
To address those gaps this paper compares the development, implementation, and im-
pacts of mandatory sustainability reporting in the Hong Kong and Singapore stock markets. 
With domestic market capitalization valued at USD 3,193,236 and USD 649,456 respectively 
(WFE 2016), HKEx and SGX are significant markets in their own right as well as serving as 
gateways for global investors to the economies of China and Southeast Asia. As such these 
two related but ‘differentiated’ (Lai 2012) Asian stock markets provide good cases for ex-
ploring how well this style of regulatory nudging fits with the various developmental state 
traditions and forms of business organization prevailing across the region. In this way we 
seek not only to further the development of what Gibbs (2006) has called ‘environmental 
economic geography’, but also to wider debates about corporate social responsibility (Or-
mond, 2015), neoliberal environmental governance (Heynen et al. 2007;  Christophers 2017), 
and varieties of capitalism in Asia (Carney et al. 2009; Zhang and Peck 2016).  
Corporate Reporting, Regulatory Styles and Asian Political Economies 
Sustainability reporting is an extension of the long-standing practice of financial reporting, 
whereby firms publish their financial accounts to show their credit-worthiness and demon-
strate to shareholders that company executives are managing firm assets in the best interests 
of their principals. Beyond the reports of financial profit and loss long required by both gen-
eral company law and the specific listing rules imposed by stock markets on publicly-traded 
companies, firms are increasingly reporting on a wide range of other non-financial matters. In 
this paper we use the term sustainability reporting generically to refer to that broader family 
of non-financial reporting practices by which firms account publicly for their wider environ-
mental, social and governance (ESG) strategies and performance.  
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 Sustainability reporting differs from traditional financial reporting in at least three re-
spects.  First, unlike financial reporting, the matters of concern that sustainability reporting 
accounts for are not always quantifiable or even tangible. For example, it took more than a 
decade for accounting organizations, business groups, and international environmental NGOs 
to develop international standards to account for GHG emissions without double counting 
(Lovell and MacKenzie 2011). Beyond GHGs, international standard-setting organizations, 
such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), have developed various other metrics and 
frameworks to help companies perform sustainability reporting in more consistent and com-
parable ways (Brown et al. 2009). Second, the expanding number of things that firms are ac-
counting for has been accompanied by an expansion in the audiences they make themselves 
accountable to. Whereas financial reporting is chiefly addressed to shareholders and creditors 
with an economic interest in firm finances, sustainability reporting addresses a much wider 
set of ‘stakeholders’ in society at large concerned about the environmental and social perfor-
mance of firms, such as consumers, government regulators, and the general public. Third, un-
like the legally mandated publication of annual financial accounts, sustainability reporting 
was historically voluntary. While international standard-setting organisations, like the GRI, 
have been instrumental in developing sustainability reporting rules, decisions about whether 
to report were traditionally left to firms themselves.  
  Scholars have offered a number of competing explanations for the spread of sustaina-
bility reporting by firms. In accounting and management studies, proponents of ‘stakeholder 
theory’ (Donaldson and Preston 1995) explain firm reporting behavior as a reflection of the 
values of those with some controlling ‘stake’-- whether as directors or in some other capac-
ity—in the firm (Cotter and Najah 2012; Liao et al. 2015). By contrast, advocates of ‘legiti-
macy theory’ explain the adoption of sustainability reporting in terms of the need for firms to 
secure acceptance from external audiences, like consumers, regulators, and NGOs (Deegan et 
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al. 2002; O’Donovan 2002). Similarly, ‘signaling’ theorists (cf. Connelly et al. 2011) under-
stand corporate disclosure as a way for managers to signal their virtue and brand their firms 
as more socially and environmentally responsible than competitors (Cormier et al 2005; Or-
mond 2015). From this perspective critics have often condemned sustainability reporting as a 
form of ‘greenwashing’, designed to conceal environmentally damaging behavior behind a 
veneer of corporate social responsibility (Cho et al. 2015; Bowen 2014). 
 In contrast to this emphasis on organizational culture and strategy, geographers more 
typically look to structural factors driving the growth of sustainability monitoring and disclo-
sure regimes. In addition to Foucaultian arguments about subjectification creating new norms 
around carbon footprinting and labelling as simply the ‘right’ thing to do (Freidberg 2014; 
Ormond and Goodman 2015), economic geographers have also shown how reporting has re-
shaped relations of power within production networks (Guthman 2007; Havice and Campling 
2017). The Carbon Disclosure Project and other sustainability league tables create strong ‘mi-
metic’ pressures (Dimaggio and Powell 1983) for firms to report like their peers, to avoid be-
ing ‘named and shamed’ by NGOs and other pressure groups (Knox-Hayes and Levy 2011).   
As sustainability reporting has become normalized over the last two decades, govern-
ments and stock market regulators are now beginning to require it as an integral part of con-
ventional corporate reporting (Table 1). KPMG’s (2016) latest ‘Carrots and Sticks’ assess-
ment of the global reporting landscape found a substantial increase in disclosure require-
ments: the total number of reporting instruments increased more than two-fold between 2013 
and 2016, with some kind of recommended or required sustainability reporting instrument 
present in 64 of 71 countries they reviewed.   
Year Jurisdiction Regulation 
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2008 Denmark The Danish Financial Statement Act mandates large compa-
nies to include ESG information with their annual reports. 
2008 Shanghai The stock exchange recommends all companies to engage in 
ESG reporting, with environmental information disclosure 
being mandatory for the extractive sector. 
2010 US The Securities and Exchanges Commission requires compa-
nies to disclose their exposure to climate risks in their annual 
filings. 
2013 UK Companies Act 2006 (Strategic Report and Directors’ Re-
ports) Regulations 2013 require listed companies to report on 
the GHG emissions for which they are responsible. 
2014 Australia Australian Securities Exchange recommends listed companies 
to disclose any material exposure to economic, environmental 
and social sustainability risks. 
2014 EU EU Directive 2014/95/EU on non-financial reporting requires 
large companies across the EU to disclose a host of infor-
mation about their ESG policies and performance. 
2015 Hong Kong HKEx mandated ESG reporting as a listing rule.  
2015 Malaysia The stock exchange requires all companies to provide a 'sus-
tainability statement' in their annual reports. 
2016 South Africa Succeeding previous King Codes that requires sustainability 
reporting, the newest King IV Code requires all listed compa-
nies to conduct integrate reporting. 
2016 Singapore SGX mandated sustainability reporting as a listing rule. 
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Table 1. Examples of jurisdictions with sustainability reporting regulations 
This growth has prompted renewed questions about the impacts and value of sustaina-
bility reporting.  In Power’s (2003) influential analysis of the ‘audit explosion’, sustainability 
reporting is purely symbolic and typically decoupled from operational practice and manage-
ment decision-making within firms. Nor is the information it generates necessarily useful for 
investors trying to make more environmentally sustainable choices (Sullivan and Gouldson 
2012). Neo-Marxist geographers have questioned the very idea that sustainability disclosures 
can fix market externalities and resolve the crisis-prone contradictions of capitalist finance 
(Bracking 2015; Christophers 2017; Johnson 2014).  
Research to date has focused much more on the uptake and response of firms rather 
than on why states or market regulatory authorities have begun to require sustainability re-
porting. However, research on other forms of mandatory business disclosure, such as the US 
EPA’s toxic release inventories (Hamilton 2005), connects them to a wider style of ‘libertar-
ian paternalist’ governance (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). It uses information to ‘nudge’ regu-
latees into changing their behavior by raising awareness of sustainability, publicizing good 
performance, and ‘naming and shaming’ laggards. This is said to be more effective and less 
costly than command-and-control regulation because it allows regulatees the flexibility to de-
cide for themselves how best to improve their own performance (GRI 2006; KPMG 2016).  
Although its proponents see sustainability reporting as universally applicable, most of 
the empirical research on the adoption and operation of ‘nudge’- style regulation has focused 
on Anglo-Saxon polities (e.g. Hamilton 2005; Jones et al. 2014; Escobar and Demeritt 2017). 
It is not clear how well regulation through disclosure will travel to other political economies. 
In east Asia, for example, strong states have traditionally faced little opposition to command-
and-control policies for achieving their economic development goals. Even if there remains 
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fierce debate about extent to which the different ways in which governments across the re-
gion have intervened to direct investment flows, organise labour markets, and steer the strate-
gies of leading sectors and firms in the interests of national competitiveness can be conceptu-
alized in term of an Asian ‘developmental state’ (Johnson 1999; Stubbs 2009). Arguably 
strong developmental states have access to more direct instruments for influencing business 
than neoliberal polities where ‘nudge’ has become the default policy option (Jones et al. 
2014). However, Yeung (2014) describes how recent shifts in global production networks 
have weakened the ability of Asian states to direct private sector activities, potentially mak-
ing nudge strategies more attractive to them as instruments of indirect economic steering. On 
the other hand, calls for sustainability reporting and transparency from business are not com-
patible with wider traditions of governance in Asia where political decision-making processes 
are often opaque, media coverage restricted by state- and self-censorship, and open public de-
bate limited (Rodan 2004).   
Nor is it clear how well regulatory mechanisms based on naming and shaming will 
function in ‘hybrid regimes’ (Diamond 2015)—transitioning states normatively accept liberal 
democracy but exhibit undemocratic or authoritarian traits— where civil society lacks the 
power, or indeed possibly even the inclination (Holden and Demeritt 2008), to exercise its 
public voice and hold poorly performing organizations to account (Hamilton 2005). In Indo-
nesia and the Philippines, for example, the USAID promoted the adoption of pollution disclo-
sure policies modelled on the US EPA toxic release inventories scheme. Though successful 
in the USA (Hamilton 2005), these policies failed in both Asian cases. Reporting require-
ments were poorly enforced by under-resourced and sometimes corrupt local officials while 
local publics struggled to access and use the information to pressure politically well-con-
nected polluters to stop (Lee 2010; Lee et al. 2013). Sustainability reporting is a different 
kind of corporate disclosure, and stock market regulators have stronger enforcement levers, 
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including de-listing, to ensure compliance. Nevertheless, questions remain about its fit with 
Asian state traditions. 
There are also questions about the ‘institutional complementarity’ (Crouch et al. 
2005) of sustainability reporting with Asian varieties of capitalism. Scholars differ about the 
diagnostic features of Asian capitalism (cf. Carney et al. 2009; Witt and Redding 2013; 
Zhang and Peck 2016), but family-controlled enterprises and business groups are often cited 
(Steier 2009), as is the involvement of leading shareholders, both as executive directors and 
major purchasers and providers, in business operations (Walter and Zhang 2012). Another 
distinguishing feature is the greater reliance of Asian production networks on informal coor-
dination through personal relationships of reciprocity, patronage, and trust rather than legally 
enforceable contracts tendered on market price alone (Yeung, 1997; Kiong and Lee, 1999). 
Such systems of ‘insider’ control and coordination reduce the demand for formal reporting 
mechanisms, like audit committees chaired by independent non-executive directors to review 
company accounts, for holding company management accountable to shareholders (Steier 
2009). Indeed research on publicly-traded companies in Hong Kong and Singapore has 
shown the quantity and frequency of corporate disclosures to be positively correlated with 
wider ownership of firms by non-insiders (Chau and Gray 2002). Given these different tradi-
tions of corporate governance, the appeals of sustainability reporting for east Asian compa-
nies, investors, and stock market regulators are far from clear.   
Case Study Rationale and Methodology  
To explore these questions, we focus on the cases of Hong Kong and Singapore, whose stock 
markets were the first in the region to require sustainability reporting. Formally, both HKEx 
and SGX are organized as private companies that in turn are regulated by government finan-
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cial market authorities in their respective jurisdictions. Hong Kong and Singapore are of sim-
ilar size, in terms of population and GDP, and share common law traditions of English com-
pany law, which Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2017) highlight as an important factor shaping inter-
national variation in reporting. Both markets cater primarily to small- and medium-capitaliza-
tion firms (those with values of less than USD 2bn and USD 10bn respectively), which com-
prise 89% of HKEx and 93.7% SGX by total number of firms (Corporate Knights Capital 
2017). These similarities have led Hong Kong and Singapore to be grouped together as exem-
plifying a distinctive type of Asian capitalism (Witt and Redding 2013). 
Our two cases differ in two other important respects, whose implications for sustaina-
bility and stock market regulation could be assessed through our comparative research de-
sign. First, despite competing fiercely with one another as international financial centers, 
Hong Kong and Singapore occupy complementary positions within the global finance system 
(Lai 2012). HKEx is much larger and more involved as a major gateway to China, now the 
world’s largest economy. The Singapore market, by contrast, is focused more on facilitating 
international trade to Southeast Asia and supporting government efforts to position the city-
state as a global hub for knowledge intensive industries (Woo 2015). This points to a second 
important difference between our case studies: the status and strength of their respective gov-
ernments. In pursuing its economic development plans, the Singapore government has exer-
cised its sovereignty as a classic developmental state (Olds and Yeung 2004). By contrast, 
Hong Kong has never been an independent state. Although promoting “the status of Hong 
Kong as an international financial centre” is set down in the Basic Law (Article 109) as a 
core duty of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), its 
formal powers to achieve that development goal have always been more limited, both under 
British colonial rule and, since 1997, under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle of lim-
ited local self-government within the People’s Republic of China.  
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 We employed a multi-method approach to collect data iteratively from three types of 
stakeholders involved in HKEx and SGX: (1) stock exchange regulators, (2) listed companies 
and (3) practitioners, such as accounting professionals, business service consultants, and 
NGOs involved in developing and implementing sustainability reporting frameworks. Our re-
search design is illustrated schematically in Figure 1: 
Figure. 1 Research design based on three iteratively consulted sources of information 
from regulators, listed companies, and practitioners in Hong Kong and Singapore 
We first analyzed policy documents, including materials from public consultations, 
company reports, grey literature, and broadsheet coverage in the business and English lan-
guage press. Only HKEx published all the responses to its consultation (n=254); responses to 
SGX were sometimes available from respondents or on respondent organization websites. 
We then conducted 40 interviews with 46 individuals – between May and September, 2017 – 
from our three stakeholder groups. Interviews were conducted in English (n=34) and Canton-
ese (n=6), as per informant preference. To mitigate the problem of key ideas being ‘lost in 
translation’, the interviewer asked for clarification of key terms in English when required. To 
encourage frank and open responses, informants and their organizations are anonymised. 
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Thus are described in broad, non-identifying terms. Many informants preferred not to be au-
dio-recorded (n=34) in which cases extensive notes were taken during the interview and then 
supplemented from memory immediately afterwards.   
Informants were asked about their current engagement and previous experience in 
sustainability reporting, their opinions about the new regulations, their personal or organiza-
tion’s involvement in their formulation, and impressions about the market’s responses to sus-
tainability reporting and the regulation. Interview notes and transcripts were then coded and 
triangulated against the documentary material to ensure analytical robustness.   
Findings 
From voluntary to mandatory sustainability reporting 
The timelines for mandating sustainability reporting in both exchanges were similar. In July 
2015, HKEx published its public consultation paper announcing its intention to “upgrade” its 
voluntary sustainability reporting guidelines to a mandatory ‘comply or explain’ basis 
(HKEx, 2015a: 3). Six months later, SGX (2016a: 2) published its own public consultation 
about “elevating” its existing voluntary reporting guide to a mandatory ‘comply or explain’ 
basis. 
Despite these similarities in timing, the two markets rationalized the move to manda-
tory sustainability reporting differently. HKEx (2015a) explained that mandatory reporting 
would address two market inefficiencies. First, in 2014 the HKSAR Government had revised 
the Companies Ordinance to require all Hong Kong incorporated companies to describe their 
ESG policies in their directors’ reports. To ensure a ‘level playing field’ across the exchange 
the HKEx proposed making sustainability reporting mandatory for all publicly-traded compa-
nies, regardless of their country of incorporation (HKEx 2014: 1). Second, the HKEx was 
concerned that the low take-up of its voluntary reporting guidance was creating information 
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asymmetries that could potentially distort the market. According to the Securities Future 
Council (SFC, 2016), the statutory agency responsible for financial services regulation in 
Hong Kong, investors should be able to engage with firms if they have concerns about ESG 
matters. This is impossible without clear and consistent disclosure. To fulfill its legal charter 
HKEx (2015a: 1) felt obligated to address this market failure and “ensure an orderly, fair and 
informed market”.  
In contrast to that narrowly technical focus on market efficiency, SGX justified man-
datory sustainability reporting by pointing to wider environmental concerns and international 
duties, specifically the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and the UN Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SGX 2016a: 1), to which the Government of Singapore, unlike the HKSAR, is a 
direct signatory. In addition to those moral and diplomatic imperatives, SGX (2016a: 2) also 
emphasized the value of sustainability reporting to companies themselves as a rationale for 
requiring companies to do it: 
“Most importantly the issuer builds enterprise value both externally through com-
munication with investors and other stakeholders as well as internally within its 
operations.”  
As in Hong Kong, few companies were reporting voluntarily, but in moving to mandatory 
sustainability reporting SGX (2016b) was less concerned with market failure than with 
“enhanc[ing] the visibility of SGX-listed companies among investors” and thereby position-
ing Singapore as a leading center for green investment in Asia.  This long-standing goal has 
even shaped the city-state’s response to climate change. Having long refused to accede to the 
Kyoto Protocol, Singapore signed on in 2005, when it perceived that joining might create op-
portunities for local business growth (Hamilton-Hart 2006).  
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Despite the contrasting rationales offered in their public consultations, key informant 
interviews suggest that in fact the decision by both markets to require sustainability reporting 
was driven by similar mimetic concerns for keeping up with international norms and compet-
itors. Asked to explain why HKEx opted for mandatory reporting, the first reason an HKEx 
official highlighted was the need to observe wider trends internationally: 
“It's a global trend and we cannot ignore it. Hong Kong is an international finan-
cial center. We need to be seen as keeping up with international regulatory de-
velopments” (Regulator, HKEx). 
Similarly, a SGX official also pointed, first and foremost, to the need to follow wider devel-
opments in sustainability reporting: 
“As more interest is developed around the topic, both from investors and from the 
wider community… we observed an upward trend and decided to act upon it” 
(Regulator, SGX)  
Indeed, informants typically only mentioned the formal justifications offered in the consulta-
tion papers when prompted. By contrast, they consistently volunteered that “lagging behind” 
competitors, as Practitioner 14 put it, was the primary rationale for mandatory reporting. As a 
SGX regulator explained: 
“Neighboring jurisdictions such as Hong Kong and Malaysia are mandating simi-
lar requirements. It is important to maintain regional competitiveness in the eyes 
of investors.”  
HKEx officials were no less concerned with how they compared with competitor ex-
changes:  
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“We regularly conduct jurisdictional comparison with the largest stock exchanges 
in the world that we deem as competitors, including London, New York, Shang-
hai, Shenzhen and Singapore...We either try to catch up or do better than them” 
(Regulator, HKEx). 
Such comments suggest regulators are strongly driven by mimetic pressure to implement sus-
tainability reporting regulations, whose appeals are ornamental rather than environmentally 
transformative. 
Reporting Rules and Principles 
Since the move to mandatory sustainability reporting was partly motivated by mimetic con-
siderations, it is perhaps not surprising that both markets looked to borrow reporting rules and 
principles from elsewhere, rather than inventing their own. One place they looked was the 
GRI, whose G3 reporting framework (cf. GRI 2006) provided a model for both HKEx and 
SGX. Specifically, HKEx based its stipulations for ‘general policy disclosures’ on G3’s 
‘management approach’ (HKEx 2015a). Likewise SGX (2016c: 4.1) recommended compa-
nies ‘reference’, without necessarily ‘report to’, the GRI reporting standards, so as not to 
overwhelm first time reporters, who, it was felt, might find its requirements too demanding 
(Regulator, SGX).  
Both exchanges also adopted the ‘comply or explain’ provision recommended by GRI 
(2013) to give companies the flexibility to opt out of particular disclosure requirements if 
they explain why. This approach was favored by practitioners in both markets as a way of 
“introducing sustainability reporting softly” (Practitioner 17, SGX) and “avoid[ing] over-reg-
ulation” by granting opt-outs while leveraging peer pressure to ensure compliance, since “out 
of competitiveness companies would avoid ‘explaining’” rather than look badly “when 
benchmarked against their peers” (Practitioner 10, HKEx). 
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Despite modeling themselves after the same GRI reporting framework, HKEx and 
SGX adopted different approaches to mandatory reporting (Table 2). HKEx was much more 
prescriptive and detailed in its specific content requirements. Having provided voluntary 
guidance and training to support sustainability reporting, HKEx (2015a: 17) found through 
“market feedback … that many issuers are waiting for the recommended disclosures of the 
ESG Guide to be upgraded to ‘comply or explain’ before they begin to report.” Accordingly, 
HKEx revised its ESG reporting guide to specify 12 areas of required disclosures about com-
pany policy as well as a further 32 environmental and social KPIs. Many of these are quanti-
tative, with 12 specific environmental KPIs also subject to the ‘comply or explain’ provision, 
including GHG emissions and intensity, waste production, and energy consumption.  
In adopting this rules-based approach, HKEx (2015a: 18) was “mindful of the risks of 
setting the ESG reporting bar too high prematurely.” Although they would also like, eventu-
ally, to do more with social issues as well, these are both more sensitive politically and more 
difficult to measure (Company 5, HKEx), so the initial mandatory KPIs are strictly environ-
mental. As a HKEx official explained:  
“[HKEx] also felt environmental issues are more pressing…if we ask too much 
we’re unlikely to get all...so if we do it step by step, we’re likely to push through 
policy changes [in other areas].” 
As part of that incremental process, the HKEx consulted in 2011 on a list of recommended 
KPIs for the voluntary ESG reporting guidelines it subsequently published in 2012. Reporting 
on those KPIs was initially voluntary because “an issuer will need to put systems in place to 
collect data and it takes time before an issuer can meaningfully report on some KPIs” (HKEx 
2011: 5). However uptake was limited. In 2015, HKEx found that 80% of large capitalisation 
firms (>USD 10bn) were following HKEx's recommendations by reporting ESG information, 
but only 36% of small capitalisation (<USD 2bn) firms. In response, HKEx (2015a: 5) 
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“upgraded” sustainability reporting to ‘comply or explain’, to compel more compliance while 
still “giving issuers flexibility” to opt out if certain KPIs proved inappropriate.   
 
 HKEx (2015b): Environment, Social 
and Governance Reporting Guide 
SGX (2016c): Sustainability Re-
porting Guide 
Reporting 
style 
Rules-based: quantitative and qualita-
tive ESG indicators 
Principle-based: qualitative assess-
ment of sustainability 
 
 
 
Content re-
quirements 
12 general policy and legislative com-
pliance disclosures  
 
32 environmental and social key per-
formance indices (KPIs), with the 9 
quantitative and 3 qualitative environ-
mental KPIs falling under 'comply or 
explain' 
Five primary reporting components: 
(1) Material ESG factors 
(2) Policy and practice  
(3) Past performance, quantitative 
indicators and future targets 
(4) sustainability reporting frame-
work 
(5) Board statement 
 
 
 
Reporting 
principles Material 
Consistency 
Materiality 
Report risks as well as opportunities 
Balanced reporting 
Performance measurement system 
Global standards comparability 
Stakeholder engagement 
Independent Assurance 
Compliance 
standard Comply or explain Comply or explain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. An outline of the reporting requirements in HKEx and SGX 
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By contrast, SGX (2016a: 6) was keen to avoid being “overly prescriptive”. Rather 
than mandating very specific disclosures or KPIs, the SGX adopted a ‘principles-based’ ap-
proach. The SGX (2016c) reporting guide outlines the broad principles that companies are 
expected to follow in order “to tailor their descriptions precisely to their own circumstances 
rather than fit their reporting to what is externally determined as appropriate” (SGX 2016a: 
4). Following the materiality principle, companies are expected to report on any ESG factors 
they consider material to company performance in a balanced and independently assured way 
that considers their performance and its comparability to global standards, as well as both 
risks and opportunities. While companies are encouraged to develop their own KPIs as ap-
propriate, SGX does not require them to report any specific ones. Rather than mandating 
what companies report, like HKEx, SGX guidelines focus on how companies report, includ-
ing the internal thinking and external communications required as well as assurance pro-
cesses underpinning their reporting.   
The contrasting choices made by HKEx and SGX to adopt rules- versus principles-
based standards reflect important differences in regulatory goals and traditions between the 
two jurisdictions. With its larger stock market HKEx (2015a: 6) was interested in sustainabil-
ity reporting to address market distorting information asymmetries and enable “investors to 
determine how best to meet their ownership responsibilities in relation to their investment in 
listed companies.” One advantage of requiring companies to report using the same KPIs is 
that standard metrics enable benchmarking and comparison. A number of informants in 
HKEx highlighted comparability as a key advantage of requiring companies to report the 
same KPIs. As Company 6 explained, “KPI approach... I think we prefer it, because it is easy 
for stakeholders to interpret and compare.” Other companies agreed that HKEx’s prescriptive 
approach was “convenient for comparison and benchmarking” (Company 7).  
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While benchmarking can also be informative for company boards, investors were the 
primary audience that HKEx (2015a: 1) was concerned with addressing with its rules-based 
approach for “encourag[ing] more widespread and standardized ESG reporting amongst issu-
ers.” As a sustainability investor responding to the HKEx consultation explained, comparable 
reporting frameworks and KPIs are: 
“necessary building block for structuring the platform development of sustainable 
financial products in the Hong Kong market. This will address the current market 
gap for impact investors (like ourselves) who are on the rise and are increasingly 
seeking to integrate ESG considerations into their investment portfolio but lack 
the product and platform in the local market” (RS Group Asia, 2015). 
But HKEx’s prescriptive approach to mandating particular quantitative environmental 
KPIs was also reinforced, informally, by the HKSAR government. One informant explained 
how HKSAR pressed HKEx to mandate GHG emission reporting to help address the city’s 
environmental and climate change goals:  
“They urged us to do things. I mean Hong Kong laws are very difficult to pass, 
the government is relatively chaotic... in other countries GHG emissions is nor-
mally regulated by law but in Hong Kong, the government basically said HKEx 
you go do something about it, as we are more effective in making companies sit 
up and listen than the government” (Regulator 2).  
This preference for using the market rather than the state to set and enforce standards 
fits with what the former Chief Executive of HKSAR Donald Tsang (2006) has called the 
“big market, small government” style of regulation. Limits to its sovereignty reinforced this 
tendency for HKSAR to act as a ‘market facilitator’ state (Mok 2008), intervening only occa-
sionally to steer social and economic development that is driven primarily by market forces 
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and a well-organized business community. Woo (2015) describes how Hong Kong’s develop-
ment as an international financial center involved relatively sharp distinctions between the 
strategic role played by the state in setting broad financial policy and that of private market 
actors who developed the sector with little direct involvement by government. Even when 
faced with the need to collect GHG emission data to fulfil its duties as part of China’s wider 
commitments to the 2015 Paris Climate Accords, HKSAR looked to private regulation 
through HKEx rather than hard mandate. Government lobbying then reinforced stock market 
regulators’ more general preferences for prescriptive KPIs to enable investors to benchmark 
company performance and thereby open the stock market to more environmentally conscious 
investors from abroad. 
 SGX’s rejection of prescriptive KPIs in favor of a principles-based approach reflected 
different market regulatory goals and the more active role played by the Singaporean state in 
standard-setting and steering development more generally. Proponents of SGX’s principles-
based approach insisted that it encouraged companies to engage more meaningfully with the 
sustainability issues material to their business.  As Practitioner 14 commented:  
“SGX’s materiality approach is better than Hong Kong’s because it encourages 
companies to consider materiality rather than just ticking boxes.”  
This view was echoed by four other practitioners. 
Flexibility, however, made it more difficult for SGX to offer investors the kind of 
like-for-like comparisons between firms and sectors so prized by HKEx. In its official con-
sultation document, SGX (2016a: 4) acknowledged that a principles-based approach would 
inevitably lead to variability in “targets and key performance indicators”. But it insisted that 
the losses in market efficiency were more than mitigated by the way that principles-based re-
porting exposed company management to more exacting and individualized scrutiny by the 
market: 
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“Not only does the ‘comply or explain’ approach provide latitude for the reporting 
issuer to put its best case to investors and other stakeholders, it also produces indi-
viduality from issuer to issuer that allows investors to discern differences and 
make assessments. The market will be richer for the variety and individuality” 
(SGX 2016a:4). 
This would force companies to think and thereby actually improve their sustainability perfor-
mance. Our SGX informant explained the rationale for its principles-based approach this 
way:  
“Part of the pain is the thinking, the reflection on materiality, but this is also the 
best outcome expected from this endeavour, which is how sustainability fits into 
the corporate strategy rather than merely completing a compliance exercise with-
out considering the impact.”  
  A principles-based approach complemented Singapore’s stated aim of using sustaina-
bility reporting to improve company performance and thus national competitiveness, though 
one informant also suggested that the decision not to require comparable KPIs was reinforced 
by “government nervous[ness] about international benchmarking” (Practitioner 13, SGX). As 
the official consultation document declared: 
“It is timely for issuers to face the issue of sustainability and consider whether and 
how it can usefully enhance business through reporting and better management of 
sustainability risks and opportunities” (SGX 2016: 3). 
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To that end a number of informants described how SGX officials engaged extensively with 
companies and with the consultants who would be involved in supporting companies to un-
derstand, report on, and manage the sustainability issues. As an informant from SGX re-
called: 
“we were trying to formulate strategies to get companies to buy into getting 
started onto the [sustainability] journey.”  
This concern with getting firms to do the right thing reflects a paternalistic tradition of 
governance in Singapore, in which the state sets broad economic and competitiveness goals 
and works closely with business leaders to achieve them (Woo 2015). SGX carefully drafted 
its guidance on sustainability reporting to reflect government preferences. As Company 2 ex-
plained: 
“The drive in regulating is intertwined between SGX keeping in line with interna-
tional trends in sustainability reporting and the Singaporean government keeping 
in line with international climate change and sustainability discourse, especially 
because in Singapore major institutions are very closely connected with the gov-
ernment.”  
Partly as a result of close governmental involvement, the SGX consultation paper not only 
rationalized sustainability reporting in terms of Singapore's international obligations to UN 
climate change and development goals, but also adopted a principles-based approach that 
complemented the government’s tradition of economic interventionism by directly obligating 
company boards to address them, rather than relying on market forces and investor pressure 
as in HKEx.  
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Initial Market Responses  
Despite those different approaches to sustainability reporting, there has been little difference 
in the initial responses to the new stock market regulations in Hong Kong and Singapore. The 
vast majority of firms listing on both markets are small and medium capitalization, and in 
both markets smaller firms tended to be more hostile to reporting than bigger ones, for rea-
sons succinctly explained by a company representative in Singapore:  
“The burden of sustainability reporting is especially harshly felt by smaller com-
panies that see it as an additional cost, because they lack the internal expertise so 
they must hire external help, and more often than not lack the resources to do 
so...SMEs are quite against it, they do not see the need, [they] see it as a cause of 
headache” (Company 11).  
Hong Kong firms complained about the compliance costs collecting and reporting on so 
many proscriptive KPIs: 
 “‘Comply or explain’ requirements will create high pressure on issuers to meet 
with the standard, where the benefits of this approach far outweigh the cost to be 
incurred, in particular, for small and medium sized listed companies” (Anony-
mous Response 4, HKEx).  
Although Singapore’s principles-based reporting requirements are more flexible and thus 
supposedly less burdensome, small cap firms there made the same kind of aggrieved but non-
specific complaints about reporting burdens as in Hong Kong. As our SGX informant ex-
plained: 
“Feedback from the small and medium cap association was ‘what could be 
changed’, in a sense that whether the requirement could be done without, and if 
it is inevitable how to make it less stringent.”  
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 In contrast to the consistent antipathy among listing firms, accountancy practitioners 
were almost uniformly supportive of the new reporting requirements imposed. After all, the 
new regulations promised generate new consultancy opportunities. However accounting prac-
titioners from both markets were pessimistic about the willingness of their clients to doing 
anything more than they had to satisfy sustainability reporting requirements. In Hong Kong, 
Practitioner 8 said, “Many companies have limited budget and resources...they only care 
about finishing the tick boxing exercise.” Practitioners in Singapore reported very similar at-
titudes: 
“80% of our clients were hostile towards the regulations.  They saw it as a box 
ticking exercise that inflicts further operational cost upon their company, so they 
were only interested in doing the minimum” (Practitioner 14, SGX).  
Although SGX’s principles-based approach was supposed to avoid box ticking and spur firms 
into reflecting on the sustainability issues material to their businesses, they were not doing so. 
As one consultant bemoaned: 
“Almost all clients are only worried about compliance and doing the minimum, 
none of them is 100% for sustainability... at first I would try to educate my clients 
about materiality and sustainability, but now I don't bother” (Practitioner 15, 
SGX). 
Informants pointed to several specific features of Asian markets that inhibited firms 
from going beyond compliance in terms either of the information they reported or actually 
using it to drive improvements in sustainability. Company 7 attributed this to the business 
culture in the region: 
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“Culture, especially amongst SMEs, is an issue. They take on a ‘defensive’ mind-
set, so they're more interested in fending off the regulation, and they're often lack-
ing an ‘entrepreneurial’ mindset, as in how can I make money out of this shift to 
sustainability discourse.” 
Many informants believed that investors on the HKEx and SGX stock exchanges 
were indifferent to sustainability disclosures. Informants repeatedly referred to sustainability 
reporting as a ‘western’ or ‘European’ practice that was somehow foreign to Asian stock 
markets. “International investors,” noted Practitioner 1, “are more concerned about issues of 
sustainability than local investors.” On the Hong Kong market, “usually it is the European in-
vestors who would require PE [private equity] firms to produce a E&S [environmental & so-
cial] risk-assessment report to inform and assist their investment decisions” (Practitioner 11). 
But they were only a small minority; most local investors did not care about sustainability. 
Similarly in Singapore, informants reported that the only interest in sustainability perfor-
mance came from US or European institutional investors whose numbers are “not significant 
enough to drive a market-wide change” (Practitioner 15), particularly as those international 
investors tended to focus on the small number of large-cap firms and ignore the small- and 
medium-cap firms who comprised the majority of issuers listing on the HKE and SGX mar-
kets. Company 15 recounted how investors in their medium-cap SGX listed firm were not in-
terested in “looking at non-financial performance…  so far I have only got one or two calls 
max asking specifically about sustainability issues. Some of them along the way ask about 
board composition or one or two other questions, but it has always been on governance, ra-
ther than carbon footprint.” 
Informants offered different explanations for the comparative indifference of local in-
vestors to sustainability reporting. Some pointed to the organisation of Asian capitalism, 
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which is more reliant on family ownership structures that see major shareholders more in-
volved in day-to-day management and hence less reliant on formal reporting processes to 
keep abreast of the firm’s operations and exposure (Chau and Gray 2002). For example, Prac-
titioner 6 explained:  
“Reporting is a very western concept...the market culture of Asia is different.  
Stakeholders are usually closer to the operational core of the company and there-
fore the demand for information, financial and non-financial alike, is lower.”  
In Hong Kong particularly, informants attributed the disinterest in sustainability reporting to 
a culture of short-termism that led investors to ignore the longer-term opportunities and risks 
for companies from sustainability issues. “Investors,” our HKEx informant complained, “are 
driven by short-termism and would not demand ESG information.” This dim assessment of 
HKEx as “full of stock punchers looking at the short-term” was echoed by Practitioner 8, 
who applauded HKEx for “introducing sustainability reporting …[and] pushing for behav-
ioral change”. Another company informant was also hopeful that the culture of HKEx was 
beginning to change: 
“Reporting is a westernized idea.  It is no longer the case that Asian businesses and 
investors care less - well, care is one thing and do is another thing, but in general we 
have seen a lot of progress here” (Company 4, HKEx). 
Informants from Singapore were slightly less optimistic, pointing to how Asian inves-
tors and citizens expected the state, rather than markets or individuals, to take responsibility 
for protecting the environment. Insisting it was “a matter of culture,” Company 2 explained:   
“In Europe and the US there is a larger social responsibility engraved into the cul-
ture and mindset not only of corporates but also of individuals, whereas in Asia 
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that’s less of an issue.  Looking after the public good is a domain of government 
rather than something consumers and companies should try for individually.” 
Beyond such sweeping, almost stereotypical, depictions of Asian publics as simply 
passive, informants highlighted some specific features of the political cultures in Hong Kong 
and Singapore that blunted the nudging effects of sustainability reporting. Although there 
were often fierce public debates in Hong Kong, environmental politics took a backseat to 
other concerns, as Practitioner 8 explained: 
“The civil discourse in Hong Kong is very politicized. We are obsessed about 
mainland-Hong Kong tension and housing problems. No one pays attention to 
more sophisticated conversations about environment sustainability beyond paper 
recycling”.  
Company 6 also bemoaned the limited public saliency of environmental issues in Hong 
Kong, blaming the local media for ‘de-amplifying’ (Kasperson et al. 1988) public concerns:  
“If you study the LegCo [Legislative Council of Hong Kong] debates they actu-
ally talk about sustainability and the environment a lot. It’s just that these things 
don’t get reported because they are not politically exciting”  
But without the threat of public mobilization (Hamilton 2013), Practitioner 12 thought sus-
tainability reporting would do little to nudge Hong Kong firms into action, since they are 
“still largely at the stage of being concerned with reputation rather than a business case for 
sustainability”.  
Although the underlying political dynamics were different in Singapore, informants 
offered a similar dim view of the effectiveness of sustainability reporting there. They noted 
that the concept of a public ‘right to know’ is thinly rooted in Singapore (Rodan 2004). Even 
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when information is publicly available, environmental campaigners in Singapore highlighted 
the difficulties in mobilizing the kind of public protests that might force action by companies, 
or indeed the government. For example, Practitioner 18 observed: 
“There is an inherent trust in well-established institutions, including large compa-
nies and government to ‘know what they are doing’ or ‘to know better’, so they 
are unwilling to challenge the actions of these institutions.” (Practitioner 18, 
SGX). 
Whereas firms in other jurisdictions felt public pressure to issue voluntary sustainability re-
ports, if only to pre-empt potential criticism by NGOs and other activists, Company 10 
thought the top-down origins of sustainability reporting in Singapore were diagnostic of a 
more general weakness of civil society in Singapore: 
“sustainability reporting has to come from the top down because the voice in civil 
society is too weak.”  
Informants agreed that having been told to report, Singaporean firms would comply with the 
letter of the law. As Company 9 explained, “Singaporeans are very law-abiding peoples, so 
notwithstanding the challenges, companies would try to produce reports of some kind.”  But 
without stronger public pressure, firms seem unlikely to do anything more.  
Conclusion 
Our comparative case study analysis of mandatory sustainability reporting in Hong Kong and 
Singapore has sought to assess the effectiveness of this style of libertarian paternalist regula-
tion and its fit with wider developmental state traditions and varieties of capitalisms in Asia. 
In both of our cases, market regulators were driven to require reporting by similar mimetic 
concerns for following international fashions and keeping pace with competitors. However, 
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there were important differences between Hong Kong and Singapore in both their formal ra-
tionales for the requirement and in the design of specific reporting standards.  
 These regulatory choices were shaped by the different state traditions and competitive 
position of each jurisdiction. HKEx rationalized sustainability reporting as necessary to fix 
inefficiencies within its much larger capital market. To that end it adopted a rules-based ap-
proach that required companies to make detailed reports on specific environmental KPIs to 
facilitate benchmarking and competition within the market. While HKSAR played an atypi-
cally prominent role in lobbying HKEx to require firms to report their GHG emissions, the 
government otherwise left private market regulators to decide for themselves whether and 
how to respond to sustainability concerns. This hands-off approach to stock market regulation 
is consistent with Hong Kong’s wider embrace of ‘big market, small government’ styles of 
neoliberal governance (Tsang 2006). Much more fundamentally, however, it reflects the lim-
ited autonomy of HKSAR, which lacks the power to act independently of Beijing and fulfill 
its duty under the Basic Law to promote “the status of Hong Kong as an international finan-
cial centre” like a classic developmental state.  
 Stock market regulation in Singapore was more directly influenced by the develop-
mental imperatives of its more muscular state. SGX justified mandatory reporting as helping 
Singapore discharge its international duties as a UN climate change signatory. Government 
officials were closely involved in designing SGX’s reporting standards, but their focus was 
not, like in Hong Kong, on sustainability reporting as an instrument of climate policy. In-
stead, Singapore officials were concerned with securing the city-state’s wider position as a 
regional business hub. A principles-based approach to reporting fit well with this develop-
mental goal and with the paternalist instincts of the Singaporean state. Rather than mandating 
specific KPIs that might expose firms to international benchmarking and make Singapore 
look bad, SGX’s reporting standards allowed companies to decide how best to report on the 
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sustainability issues material to their business. In turn the materiality principle gave the gov-
ernment a mechanism to obligate company boards to address their own sustainability perfor-
mance directly, rather than relying on market forces and indirect pressure from investors as in 
HKEx.  
Our findings suggest that mandatory sustainability reporting will do little either in 
Hong Kong or Singapore to nudge businesses towards sustainability. Both markets are domi-
nated by small and mid-cap firms, which responded with similar antipathy to the new report-
ing regulations, despite the substantial differences in their design. While business complaints 
about compliance costs are not unexpected, what is more surprising—and more significant 
for the effectiveness of sustainability reporting— was the widespread indifference of local 
publics and investors. In both Hong Kong and Singapore sustainability reports were of inter-
est only to a small number of western institutional investors, whose positions were too small 
to move either market or influence company operations. 
  Our article is hardly the first to have questioned the effectiveness of such libertarian 
paternalist policies in improving environmental performance (Guthman 2007; Shove 2010; 
Escobar and Demeritt 2017). By showing that reporting regulations in Hong Kong and Singa-
pore are performative window-dressing with little consequence for investment flows or inter-
nal business practice, we confirm the findings from past research on sustainability reporting 
in the US and Europe (e.g. Sullivan and Gouldson 2012; Tang and Demeritt 2017). However, 
in contrast to widespread complaints in the west about ‘greenwashing’ (Bowen 2014; Cho et 
al. 2015), we found very little concern for environmental legitimacy among businesses in 
Hong Kong or Singapore. Far from issuing reports to signal their virtue, listed companies had 
mandatory sustainability reporting forced upon them by stock market regulators keen to se-
cure their own legitimacy by keeping up with international listing norms adopted by stock 
markets elsewhere. In this context it is not surprising that firms saw little reason to go beyond 
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compliance, since the impetus for reporting in both markets was primarily mimetic legiti-
macy-seeking rather than any strategic concerns for their environmental reputation.   
Beyond these empirical contributions to the literatures on corporate social responsibil-
ity and environmental regulation in Asia, our paper contributed theoretically by conceptualis-
ing sustainability reporting as a form of libertarian paternalism and exploring its fit with the 
state traditions and varieties of capitalism in two contrasting cases. In this way we sought to 
provincialize libertarian paternalism, which has been debated with reference to canonical ex-
amples drawn largely from the US and UK (e.g., Shove 2010; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). 
Partly of course, this is because those neoliberal states have been its most enthusiastic propo-
nents, but their particularities are often forgotten amidst the heated debates about nudge as a 
universal policy paradigm. The case of sustainability reporting in Hong Kong and Singapore 
provides an opportunity to see how well these ideas travel and to identify the institutional fac-
tors required for their success.  
Our analysis highlights several inter-related features of Asian political economies that 
reduce the effectiveness of sustainability reporting. First, such formalized methods of ac-
counting for firm performance play a limited role in the financing, organization, and control 
of many east Asian companies. Whereas institutional investors in the west typically favor 
large capitalization firms, both HKEx and SGX are dominated by small- and medium- capi-
talization firms. Such enterprises often have narrow, family-based ownership structures 
whose principal shareholders are closely involved in business operations either as directors or 
through personal involvement with associated firms up and down the supply chain. Sustaina-
bility reporting has less influence on these insiders, who can draw on other sources of infor-
mation, than on outside institutional investors who depend on such forms of external audit 
control to keep appraised of their holdings and ensure they are well managed.  
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Second, we also found evidence that local investors on the Hong Kong and Singapore 
stock markets are indifferent to sustainability concerns. Compared to western institutional in-
vestors, whose principals are notorious for their sensitivity to ESG issues and sustainability 
reporting about them (Cotter and Najah 2012), our informants consistently reported that local 
investors were unmoved by environmental concerns. Accordingly sustainability reports 
played no role in their assessment of a firm’s economic prospects and profitability.  
In turn, this de-coupling was reinforced in different ways by the wider political cul-
tures and state traditions of Hong Kong and Singapore, which limit environmental mobiliza-
tion and conflict with the tacit liberalism that sustainability reporting depends on and extends. 
Though energetic, Hong Kong’s public sphere is absorbed by political controversies over its 
relationship with China, and environmental campaigns struggle for public attention. Singa-
pore’s political culture is more quiescent but no less indifferent to environmental concerns, 
which have long been subordinated to the technocratic demands of its developmental state 
(Neo 2007; Han 2017). Partly owing to the lack of openness in the decision making by gov-
ernments and other large institutions in both polities, in terms of transparent processes and 
inclusive participation, the publics are not in the habit of listening when companies make sus-
tainability disclosures. Even if they were, state concerns with maintaining social order, al-
ways strong in Singapore and increasingly so in Hong Kong, limit the scope to organize con-
sumer boycotts or other forms of popular protest that might challenge leading firms for their 
environmentally destructive practices. Without stronger mechanisms for NGOs, consumers, 
and wider publics to hold companies accountable (Hamilton 2013), firms have little financial 
or reputational incentive to respond to the nudge provided by sustainability reporting. 
Beyond Hong Kong and Singapore, these problems with investor indifference and 
weak public voice are likely to apply elsewhere across the region. In this way our research 
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raises some more general questions about the geographic specificity of sustainability report-
ing that the normative tone of debate about libertarian paternalism tends to overlook. Further 
comparative research into other forms of disclosure-based nudging in Asia would help iden-
tify the relative importance of the two factors highlighted by our research for the ineffective-
ness of sustainability reporting regulations.  If investor indifference is the key barrier to suc-
cessful sustainability reporting, we might expect disclosure policies aimed at other audiences, 
such as consumer labelling, to be more effective at nudging corporate behavior change 
(Bowen and Panagiotopoulos, 2018).  However, if other disclosure-based nudging policies 
equally fail to gain traction amongst consumers, we could then be more confident of the de-
terminant impact of the weakness of the public sphere.   
To date the bulk of research in economic geography on environmental certification 
and disclosure has focused on the US and Europe (e.g. Roracher 2009; Foley and Hébert 
2013), but with promises of the universal effectiveness of ‘nudging’ through environmental 
disclosure driving their spread into Asia and beyond, further research is needed to explore the 
impacts and effectiveness in other contexts.  For example, Johannesburg Exchange in South 
Africa is the global pioneer in mandating ‘integrated reporting’ (IoDSA 2009). Research in 
such developing markets would help clarify the drivers and institutional prerequisites for the 
effectiveness of disclosure policies in promoting corporate sustainability. These avenues of 
research solicits the attention of economic geographers, not least for the increasing promi-
nence of the phenomenon in both the business sector and in international politics. Such re-
search thus answers to the call for economic geographers to connect the 'economics’ with the 
‘environment’ in current times of ecological crisis and environmental change (Gibbs 2009). 
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